

## Impact of inverter – based resources on transient stability and consequences for protection performance requirements

### Protection And Automation B5

PS1 Q1.04 Are there any key considerations  
for securing the ROCOF protection against  
maloperation?


Matankiso Mohlokoana (South Africa)

# Are there any key considerations for securing the ROCOF protection against maloperation?

- SAGC requires RPPs to detect an Islanding condition, and to tripping within 2 sec.
  - ROCOF is one of the ways to detect islanding by RPPs
  - SAGC stipulates that RPPs should only operate for ROCOF that is above 1.5 Hz/s.
  - ROCOF elements can thus not be set more sensitively than 1.5Hz/s.
- Eskom Tx has experience with the application of ROCOF protection for the detection of power network islands - blocking UFLS protection
  - UFLS relay operations during islanding conditions - are a nuisance requiring additional switching to restore supply
- An Eskom Tx study into causes of UFLS relay mis-operations highlights four network scenarios, that have led to mis-operations of level-detection frequency protection
  - 1) Voltage ring-down events;
  - 2) Rapid voltage changes due to network faults;
  - 3) Rapid voltage changes due to secondary VT circuit connection problems; and
  - 4) Islanding.

Group Discussion Meeting

- Scenarios (1) to (3) can be expected to also cause mis-operation of instantaneous ROCOF elements set for islanding detection by RPPs
- A recognised way of stabilising UFLS relays from misoperation, is the application of an “average ROCOF” function
  - An average ROCOF function – provided by some IED brands
  - Based on two level detection elements that are set a with a freq diff  $\Delta F$ .
  - A timer is started when the  $F_m$  crosses the upper freq threshold - IED checks the  $F_m$  a set time,  $\Delta t$ , later
  - If  $F_m$  at set time ( $\Delta t$ ) is lower than the lower set freq threshold, then the avg ROCOF is higher than the setting, and the relay operates.
- Eskom experience is that average ROCOF elements are much more secure and reliable than instantaneous ROCOF elements.
- By assessing ROCOF over a set time window, mis-operations due to short duration network disturbances, such as scenarios (1) to (3) can be avoided



- In RPP applications where tripping for an islanding condition is only required within 2 seconds, an average ROCOF time window of 0.5s could be applied.
- It is surprising that more IED manufacturers do not include average ROCOF protection elements in their IEDs